What We Can Learn
How Switzerland, Norway, and South Korea manage large projects successfully – and what Germany can learn from them
The litany of failed German megaprojects is well known: BER airport, Stuttgart 21 railway station, Elbphilharmonie concert hall. The "Iron Law of Megaprojects" – over budget, over time, over and over again – seems inescapable. But looking beyond German borders reveals a different picture: it can be done differently. Some countries have systematically achieved better results with large-scale projects. What are they doing differently?
The central insight: Successful megaprojects are not a matter of luck or national mentality, but the result of smart institutional arrangements.
The Success Models
Switzerland
Gotthard Base Tunnel (NEAT)
The world's longest railway tunnel – 57 kilometers through the Alps – was completed on time and on budget in 2016. Seventeen years of construction for a project of this complexity is remarkably short.
Success Factors:
- 1992 referendum with 64% approval – democratic legitimacy from the start, no more political back-and-forth possible
- Secure financing independent of annual state budgets and political cycles
- Permanent parliamentary oversight through a standing control committee with real powers
- Experts at the top – project director Renzo Simoni was a civil engineer, not an administrative bureaucrat
- Realistic buffers for geological risks calculated from the beginning
- 100+ years of tunnel-building expertise – institutional memory of Swiss railways
"No matter how high the mountain and how hard the rock – where there's a will, there's a way. We can do it because we want it." — Moritz Leuenberger, Swiss Federal Councillor, at the breakthrough in 2010
Norway
KS1/KS2 Quality Assurance System
After a series of expensive failures in the late 1990s, Norway introduced a systematic quality assurance system for major public projects in 2000. The result: measurably better cost forecasts and project selection.
The Two-Stage System:
- KS1 (since 2005): Concept review – "Is it the right project?" Examination of alternatives, cost-benefit analysis, net present value
- KS2 (since 2000): Cost review after preliminary planning – "Are budget, risk assessment, and management basis correct?"
- Independent external reviewers with framework contracts at the Ministry of Finance – not the applying ministries
- Ministry of Finance as gatekeeper – no funding without QA approval
- Reference Class Forecasting – systematic comparison with similar completed projects
- Publication of results – transparency creates discipline
South Korea
PFS – Preliminary Feasibility Study
In response to inefficient public investments, South Korea introduced a strict review system in 1999. What makes it special: projects actually get rejected – over a third fail the review.
Success Factors:
- Independent institution (KDI/PIMAC) at the Korea Development Institute – not at the applying ministries
- Threshold: >50 bn KRW (~$40m) for mandatory review
- 6 review rounds per project – multi-stage review with external experts
- Real selection – 36.7% of projects are rejected, creating discipline in applications
- Results are published – political pressure for honesty
- Ministry of Finance oversees – Budget Authority, not Line Ministries
The Crucial Point
The Korean system works because it has real consequences. When projects are practically never rejected, there's no incentive for honest cost estimates. The 36.7% rejection rate is not a sign of bureaucracy, but of discipline.
The Systematic Comparison
What distinguishes successful countries from Germany? The following table shows the essential institutional differences:
| Success Factor | 🇨🇭 | 🇳🇴 | 🇰🇷 | 🇬🇧 | 🇩🇪 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independent review body | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Finance Ministry as gatekeeper | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Real rejection rate (>20%) | ⚠ | ✓ | ✓ | ⚠ | ✗ |
| Referendum/legitimacy | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Experts in leadership | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ⚠ | ✗ |
| Transparency/publication | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Reference Class Forecasting | ✓ | ✓ | ⚠ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Secure long-term financing | ✓ | ⚠ | ⚠ | ✗ | ✗ |
✓ = present, ⚠ = partial, ✗ = missing
The Core Lessons
1. Institutional Independence
The applying authority must not simultaneously conduct the review. In Korea, KDI/PIMAC rejects over a third of projects – Germany has no comparable independent review body. When the fox guards the henhouse, don't be surprised by the results.
2. Finance Ministry as Gatekeeper
In Norway, the UK, and Korea, the Finance Ministry must approve major projects. This creates a natural tension between the line ministries that want to build and the institution that manages the money. In Germany, line ministries have too much autonomy – and too little counterweight.
3. Real Selection
When projects are practically never rejected, there's no incentive for honest cost estimates. The Korean system works because the 36.7% rejection rate is real. Applicants know that unrealistic projects can actually fail – and calculate more carefully accordingly.
4. Technical Expertise at the Top
The Gotthard Base Tunnel was led by a civil engineer. BER was overseen by politicians and administrative bureaucrats without construction expertise. This is not coincidence but system: in Germany, megaprojects are treated as political undertakings, not technical challenges.
5. Long-term Financing Security
Switzerland decoupled the Gotthard from the normal state budget. The project could not be jeopardized by political priority shifts. In Germany, every new government can change budget priorities – which leads to stop-and-go financing that makes projects more expensive and delays them.
6. Democratic Legitimacy
64% of Swiss voters approved the Gotthard in 1992 – after that, there was no fundamental opposition. In Germany, megaprojects are often decided without genuine citizen participation, then fought for years in courts and on the streets. The costs of these subsequent conflicts are enormous.
What Germany Could Concretely Do
1. Federal Agency for Major Projects
An independent review body following the Norwegian/Korean model, located at the Finance Ministry, with real rejection powers. Threshold: all projects >€500m.
2. Real Rejection Rate
The agency must be able to reject at least 20-30% of applications. Only when applicants know that unrealistic projects can actually fail will they calculate honestly.
3. Technical Expertise in Leadership
Project leaders of major projects must have relevant technical experience. Lawyers and administrative bureaucrats can support, but not lead.
4. Special Fund for Megaprojects
Long-term financing independent of the annual budget to prevent stop-and-go financing. Following the Swiss model.
5. Transparency Requirement
All cost forecasts, risk analyses, and review reports must be published. Public scrutiny creates discipline.
6. Mandatory Citizen Participation
For projects >€1bn, binding referendums or extended participation procedures should be required. Early legitimacy saves later resistance.
Conclusion
Germany's megaproject problem is not a law of nature. It is the result of institutional misaligned incentives that can be corrected. Switzerland, Norway, and South Korea demonstrate that it's possible to deliver complex infrastructure projects on time and on budget.
The necessary reforms are neither mysterious nor particularly difficult. However, they require politics to give up control – to independent review bodies, to experts, to citizens. That is the real price of success.
The methods are known. The data is available. What is missing is the political will for institutional reform.
The question is not whether Germany can do better. The question is whether it wants to.